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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Cody Porter Radford appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon his conditional guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute.  Radford challenges the denial of his motion to suppress and his 
sentence.   
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
Dispatch received a call that the driver of a black Kia SUV was driving 
erratically on the interstate and had “struck a center divider.”  (R., p.8.)  Idaho 
State Police Sergeant T. Johnson also saw the SUV pass him and “advised” the 
SUV “had almost hit a barrier wall.”  (R., p.8.)  Corporal H. Branch responded to 
the call and, after locating the SUV, he initiated a traffic stop.  (R., p.8.)  When 
Corporal Branch made contact with the driver of the SUV, who identified himself 
as Radford, Corporal Branch noticed Radford’s “eyes were red and watery and 
had a ‘droopy’ appearance,” which was “[i]ndicative of marijuana use.”  (R., p.8.)  
Radford admitted he smoked marijuana the day before, but he “performed 
satisfactorily” on the field sobriety tests Corporal Branch asked him to perform.  
(R., p.8.)  Radford explained his driving behavior by claiming he was tired.  (R., 
p.8.)   
Corporal Branch arrested Radford for reckless driving.  (R., p.9.)  During 
an inventory search, Corporal Branch found a metal container with two needles 
inside.  (R. p.9.)  When he asked Radford “what the needles were for,” Radford 
answered, “[e]vidently drugs of some sort.”  (R., p.9.)  Corporal Branch asked 
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whether it was “Meth or Heroin” and Radford said, “Yes.”  (R., p.9.)  Corporal 
Branch also found “7 separately sealed packages of a green leafy substance,” 
with a total weight of 5.85 pounds, and drug paraphernalia.  (R., p.9.)  The state 
charged Radford with trafficking in marijuana, possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), possession of drug paraphernalia, and reckless 
driving.  (R., pp.54-56, 139-140.) 
Radford filed a motion to suppress, asserting “the warrantless stop and 
arrest by the officers was unlawful and without legal justification.”  (R., p.59.)  
Radford also asserted Trooper Branch “did not have the power to arrest the 
defendant for a misdemeanor offense that was not committed in [his] presence.”  
(R., p.60.)  The district court denied the motion, finding there was reasonable 
suspicion to stop Radford, and probable cause to arrest him.  (Tr., p.47, Ls.11-
13, p.49, L.20 – p.50, L.3; see R., p.80.)   
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Radford entered a conditional guilty plea to 
an amended charge of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and the 
state dismissed the remaining charges.  (Tr., pp.52-59; R., pp.142-143, 146-
148.)  Radford reserved the right to challenge the denial of his suppression 
motion.  (R., p.148.)  The court imposed a unified three and one-half year 






 Radford states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Radford’s motion to  
suppress? 
 
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr.  
Radford to three and one-half years, with one year fixed, for 
possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Because Radford has conceded the district court’s suppression decision 
“is supported by the evidence and law,” and because Radford has offered no 
argument to support a finding of error in the district court’s decision, has he 
waived his claim of error? 
 
2. Has Radford failed to show his three and one-half year sentence, with one 












 The district court denied Radford’s suppression motion, finding there was 
reasonable articulable suspicion to support the traffic stop and probable cause to 
arrest Radford for reckless driving.  (Tr., p.47, Ls.11-13, p.49, L.20 – p.50, L.3.)    
On appeal, Radford is “[m]indful that the court’s decision is supported by the 
evidence and the law,” but nevertheless “contends that the district court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  Application of the 
correct legal standards to the facts shows what Radford concedes – Radford 
was not entitled to suppression.  In light of Radford’s concession, and his failure 
to present any argument, he has waived his claim of error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the 
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as 




C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That, Under The Relevant Legal 
Standards, Radford’s Detention Was Supported By Reasonable Suspicion 
And His Arrest Was Lawful And Supported By Probable Cause; Radford 
Has Waived Any Claim That The District Court Erred 
 
A routine traffic stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure of the 
vehicle’s occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 
(1979); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 
1998). “An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific 
articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or 
is about to be engaged in criminal activity.”  State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 
983, 88 P.3d 1220,1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted).  “The justification for 
an investigative detention is evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances 
then known to the officer.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “For an arrest to be 
considered lawful, it must be based on probable cause” to believe the arrestee 
has committed a crime.  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d 1203, 
1215 (2009) (citations omitted).  “Probable cause exists when the facts and 
circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the 
offense has been or is being committed.”  Id. (citations, quotations, and brackets 
omitted).  An officer may arrest a defendant for reckless driving so long as that 
arrest is supported by probable cause.  I.C. § 49-1405(1)(f).      
After considering the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the 
district court found, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Corporal 
Branch had reasonable suspicion to stop Radford.  (Tr., p.47, Ls.11-15.)  This 
conclusion was based on the information provided to Corporal Branch by the 
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caller who contacted dispatch as well as the information reported by Sergeant 
Johnson.  (Tr., p.47, L.15 – p.48, L.2.)  Although Radford recites the applicable 
legal standards for reasonable articulable suspicion, he does not present any 
argument that the district court misapplied those standards or that the district 
court’s factual findings were incorrect.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-6.)  In fact, 
Radford concedes the district court’s decision “is supported by the evidence and 
the law.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)  Radford also concedes the district court’s 
conclusion that Corporal Branch could lawfully arrest Radford for reckless driving 
and had probable cause to do so “is supported by the evidence and the law.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) 
Because Radford concedes the “evidence and the law” support the district 
court’s decision, and because Radford has failed to provide any argument to 
support a finding of error in the district court’s decision, he has waived any claim 
that the district court erred.  See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 
709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 
(1996)) (noting an issue will not be considered if “either authority or argument is 
lacking”).      
 
II. 





Radford contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing a 
unified three and one-half year sentence, with one year fixed, for possession of 
marijuana with the intent to distribute.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  More specifically, 
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Radford argues his “sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating evidence,” 
including his “struggle[ ] with addiction,” his “plans to participate in substance 
abuse treatment,” and his family support.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-8.)  To the 
contrary, the district court acted well within its discretion and consistent with the 
objectives of sentencing; Radford has failed to meet his burden of showing 
otherwise.  
  
B. Standard Of Review 
 
A district court’s sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Imposing 
A Unified Three And One-Half Year Sentence, With One Year Fixed, For 
Possession Of Marijuana With Intent To Deliver 
 
In order to demonstrate an abuse of the district court’s sentencing 
discretion, Radford must “establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, 
the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment.”  
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).  Those 
objectives are: “(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the 
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or 
retribution for wrong doing.”  State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 
730 (1978).  Radford cannot meet his burden in this case. 
In imposing sentence, the district court recited the objectives of 
sentencing, and correctly noted that Radford had demonstrated an “incredible 
disrespect for the law.”  (Tr., p.80, Ls.16-23.)  Consistent with this point, 
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Radford’s presentence report reveals Radford has a lengthy criminal history, 
which includes convictions for delivery of a controlled substance, driving under 
the influence, pedestrian under the influence, resisting or obstructing officers, 
reckless driving, and leaving the scene of an accident.  (PSI, pp.4-8.)  Radford 
also has a history of violating his probation.  (PSI, p.5.)  Also noteworthy is 
Radford’s behavior in relation to his substance abuse evaluation.  When the 
evaluator first attempted to schedule Radford’s appointment, she was unable to 
contact him because the numbers he provided were “no longer in service.”  (PSI, 
p.23.)  When the evaluator was finally able to schedule Radford’s appointment, 
he failed to show.  (PSI, p.23.)  Radford did appear for his second appointment, 
but demonstrated signs of impairment.  (PSI, p.23.)  Radford admitted that, if he 
submitted to a urinalysis at that time, it would not be “clean” because he had 
used a controlled substance two days prior.  (PSI, p.23.)  Ultimately, the 
evaluator was unable to complete the assessment because of Radford’s 
condition.  (PSI, pp.23-24.)     
As for the “mitigating evidence” Radford recites on appeal, this information 
was before the district court at the time of sentencing, and none of the 
“evidence” compels a lower sentence.  That Radford disagrees with how the 
district court weighed the evidence and balanced the objectives of sentencing 
does not show an abuse of discretion.  See State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 
879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011) (“In this case, Windom essentially asks this Court 
to re-weigh the evidence presented to the district court and reach a different 
conclusion . . ..  However, our role is not to reweigh the evidence considered by 
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the district court; our role is to determine whether reasonable minds could reach 
the same conclusion as did the district court.”).   
Based on the nature of the offense, Radford’s history, his behavior during 
the substance abuse evaluation, and the objectives of sentencing, a unified three 
and one-half year sentence, with one year fixed, is not excessive under any 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction entered upon Radford’s conditional guilty plea to possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute. 




      /s/ Jessica M. Lorello_______________ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
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